



NEWSLETTER 2023|18

CALENDAR

Departmental Seminar

Tommaso Proietti (Tor Vergata University of Rome)

"Another Look at Dependence: the Most Predictable Aspects of Time Series"

IOS Seminar

Astghik Mavisakalyan

(Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre at Curtin University)

"Mining and Mistrust in Government"

Lunch Seminar

Nicole Gürtzgen (University of Regensburg)

"Do Employers Learn More from Referrals than from Other Recruitment Channels?"

Economic and Social History Seminar

Mark Spoerer (Regensburg)

"Regensburg und Messerschmitt"

Mon, July 10

16:00 - 17:30

H 26

Tue, July 11

14:00 - 15:30

109 and

Zoom-Meeting

Wed, July 12

12:00 - 13:00

H 26

Wed, July 12**19:00 - 21:15****Großer****Runtingsaal**

(Keplerstr. 1)



ABSTRACTS AND FURTHER INFORMATION

Departmental Seminar

Tommaso Proietti (Tor Vergata University of Rome)

“Another Look at Dependence: the Most Predictable Aspects of Time Series”

Serial dependence and predictability are two sides of the same coin. The literature has considered alternative measures of these two fundamental concepts. In this paper, we aim to distil the most predictable aspect of a univariate time series, i.e., the one for which predictability is optimized. Our target measure is the mutual information between the past and future of a random process, a broad measure of predictability that takes into account all future forecast horizons rather than focusing on the one-step-ahead prediction error mean square error. The first most predictable aspect is defined as the measurable transformation of the series, which maximizes the mutual information between past and future. The proposed transformation arises from the linear combination of a set of basis functions localized at the quantiles of the unconditional distribution of the process. The mutual information is estimated as a function of the sample partial autocorrelations, by a semiparametric method which estimates an infinite sum by a regularized finite sum. The second most predictable aspect can also be defined, subject to suitable orthogonality restrictions. We also investigate using the most predictable aspect for testing the null of no predictability.

Info:

in person



IOS Seminar

Astghik Mavisakalyan (Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre at Curtin University)

“Mining and Mistrust in Government”

Recent research shows that natural resources can hurt institutions by promoting corruption and diverting resources from the production of public goods. This, in turn, may have implications for the trust individuals have in their governments. We investigate this possibility by linking geo-referenced survey data for over 28,000 individuals with spatial data on mine locations in 28 post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. By exploiting the information on the development status of each mine site, we compare individuals living in the vicinity of producing versus not-yet-producing mines, relying on a cross-sectional difference in-differences approach. We find a negative relationship between mining production and trust in government, a result robust to a battery of tests. Our analysis of the mechanisms reveals that corruption perceptions and practices are likely the channels underlying this relationship. Additionally, we investigate potential non-institutional mechanisms as alternative channels but do not find evidence that they are at work.

Info:

In person in Room 109 (Landshuter Str. 4) and via Zoom-Meeting:

<https://ios-regensburg-de.zoom.us/j/67668172573?pwd=WHNvenF1cG04MW1odkJKZTI0VmVhQT09>

Meeting ID: 676 6817 2573

Passcode: 880357

Lunch Seminar

Nicole Görtzgen (University of Regensburg)

“Do Employers Learn More from Referrals than from Other Recruitment Channels?”

We study whether referrals deliver better information about the productivity of new hires than other recruiting channels. Using combined vacancy-register data, we first document that referrals are associated with less formal screening and lower search costs. We demonstrate that the referral wage premium is informative on referrals' information advantage only if differences in screening are accounted for. Consistent with the predictions from a learning model, referrals increase the stability and wages of new matches, with the effects diminishing as tenure proceeds. Results suggest that the information advantage of referrals is particularly pronounced for male and previously non-employed workers.

Info:

in person



Economic and Social History Seminar

Mark Spoerer (Regensburg)

“Regensburg und Messerschmitt”

Im Juli 1936 gründeten die in Augsburg ansässigen Bayerischen Flugzeugwerke in Regensburg ein Zweigwerk, die Messerschmitt GmbH, die im Januar 1938 die Produktion aufnahm. Welche Wirkungen hatte diese Investition eines High-Tech-Unternehmens für Regensburg und die Region?

Info:

In person

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Wednesday, July 12 | 11 am

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