



NEWSLETTER 2020-02

CALENDAR:

PhD Seminar

Stefanie Braun (Regensburg):
*The Effects of Institutional, Political and Macroeconomic Factors
on the German Housing and Land Markets*

Monday, January 20
16:00
H 26

IOS Seminar

Martin Hoffstadt (Leibniz Universität Hannover):
*Does Status Really Matter? Administrative Reform in Yugoslavia
1955–1971*

Tuesday, January 21
13:30–15:30
WiOS 109 (Landshuter Str. 4)

Lunch Seminar

Jana Friedrichsen (DIW Berlin):
*Choosing between explicit Cartel
Formation and Tacit Collusion: an Experiment*

Wednesday, January 22
12:00–13:30
VG 2.35

Economic and Social History Seminar

Fabian Standl (München):
*Panikmache oder begründete Sorge? Virus-Grippe-Pandemien und
ihr sozioökonomischer Niederschlag in den statistischen
Jahrbüchern der Schweiz*

Wednesday, January 22
18:15–20:30
VG 1.30

ABSTRACTS:

IOS Seminar

Martin Hoffstadt:

Does Status Really Matter? Administrative Reform in Yugoslavia 1955–1971

Abstract: We assess the evolution of the communal system in socialist Yugoslavia in order to address the question whether the merger of communes led to economies of scale. In contrast to previous research that has assessed the outcome of subnational border reforms at the aggregation-level of post-merger municipalities, we make use of settlement-level data on employment and ethnicity. This approach allows us to analyse 1,430 administrative towns as winners and losers, relative to administrative towns of unreformed communes. Our first results indicate that the number of administrative workers was reduced considerably in communes that were part of merger reforms. Furthermore, we find that the reduction of administrative workers did occur only in administrative towns that lost their status to other administrative towns, while the number of administrative workers in the winning administrative towns remained unchanged. Finally, this effect appears to be more severe when mergers occur across ethnic borders.

Lunch Seminar

Jana Friedrichsen:

Choosing between explicit Cartel Formation and Tacit Collusion: an Experiment

Abstract: Competition authorities try to hinder the formation of cartels because they harm social welfare. Firms nevertheless try to collude while avoiding sanctions, for example by colluding tacitly instead of explicitly forming a cartel. In this paper, we use an experimental treatment variation that manipulates how explicitly firms communicate about prices. Using a machine learning approach, we find evidence that communication is less explicit about prices with law enforcement than without a competition authority and that less explicit communication results in lower prices. These findings indicate, that law enforcement is an effective instrument to hinder cartel formation because it reduces explicit price communication.

Economic and Social History Seminar

Fabian Standl:

Panikmache oder begründete Sorge? Virus-Grippe-Pandemien und ihr sozioökonomischer Niederschlag in den statistischen Jahrbüchern der Schweiz

Abstract: Im September 2019 warnte Gro Harlem Brundtland (ehemalige Generaldirektorin der Weltgesundheitsorganisation [WHO]), vor der Möglichkeit einer neuen Pandemie, die weltweit bis zu 80 Millionen Menschen leben fordern könnte. Sofort bemühten die Medien überlieferte Schreckensbilder der Spanischen Grippe und warfen auch die Frage auf, welche Folgen eine solche Pandemie für die Welt haben könnte. Der Vortrag vermittelt einen soziökonomischen Gesamtüberblick der Schweiz im Zeitraum von 1885 bis 1925 und geht der Frage nach, welche Auswirkungen Virus-Grippe-Pandemien haben. Was sagen die Zahlen – ist es nur Panikmache oder sollten sich Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft ernsthafte Sorgen machen?

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